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Abuse of the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine by Presidential Incumbents
By MARTINE SAFRAN*
I
Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, television has become one of
the major sources of public information regarding Presidaential
candidates.' The candidates have learned to use and abuse the
regulations regarding political broadcasting in order to receive
maximum exposure to the public. As a result, during every
presidential election year the Federal Communications Com-
mission2 is inundated with equal opportunities claims by the
candidates. 3 This note centers on the one candidate, the presi-
dential incumbent, who, because of his position and the FCC
interpretations of the rules on political broadcasting, can most
abuse the media through the equal time doctrine.4 A discus-
sion of the legislative history of the equal time provision and
the ways in which the incumbent uses this doctrine to his ad-
vantage is followed by suggested reforms.
II
The Legislative History
of Section 315
In 1927, Congress was aware of the necessity to regulate
broadcasting channels. The number of frequencies available
for radio was limited and every day new broadcasting stations
were going on the air.' Congress therefore enacted the Radio
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. THE ROPER ORG., INC., CHANGING PuBLic ATTrrUDES TowARDs TELEVISION AND
OTHER MASS MEDIA 1959-76 (1977).
2. The Federal Communications Commission will be referred to as the "FCC" or
the "Commission."
3. For an explanation of what gives rise to an equal opportunities claim, see text
accompanying notes 12-20, infra.
4. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
5. "Every wave length now is jammed with stations, because stations are going on
COMM/ENT
Act of 1927, which established the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC) as the administrative agency to regulate the air waves
"as public convenience, interest, or necessity" required.
The Radio Act of 1927 included a provision for political
broadcasts by legally qualified candidates. 7 This section was
the result of balancing the public's interest in receiving infor-
mation, the broadcasters' interest in disseminating news and
choosing what they consider to be newsworthy, and the candi-
dates' interest in being heard by the public. Section 18 re-
quired that once a broadcaster gave a candidate access to the
air, he must provide all other legally qualified candidates for
that public office equal opportunities for the use of his broad-
casting facilities.'
As technology advanced and the media industry grew, new
legislation was needed. The Radio Act of 1927 was repealed
and incorporated in the Communications Act of 1934.9 The
Federal Communications Commission replaced the FRC and
was granted the power by Congress to regulate radio and tele-
vision. 10 Section 18 was adopted in toto by Section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934. This clause remained the same
until 1959.
During the 1959 mayoral election campaign, Richard Daley
appeared on televised news clips in his official capacity as
mayor of Chicago. The broadcast appearances consisted of
greeting the President of Argentina and appealing for contribu-
tions for the March of Dimes. Lar Daly, an opposing candidate
the air every day. I think there are 712 or 715 to-day, and there will be 720 to-morrow.
The air is getting crowded more every day .... " 68 CONG. REC. 3029 (1927) (remarks of
Sen. Dill).
6. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L No. 632, ch. 169, §§ 3-4, 44 Stat. 1162 [hereinafter
cited as Radio Act of 19271.
7. Id. at § 18.
8. Section 18 provided in full:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station, and the licensing authority shall make rules and regulations to carry
this provision into effect: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph.
No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its sta-
tion by any such candidate.
9. The Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-608) (1976).
10. Id. at §§ 1, 5.
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for mayor, requested equal time" due to Mayor Daley's ap-
pearances. The FCC determined both appearances of the
Mayor to be "uses" of a broadcast station under section 315,
thereby entitling Lar Daly to equal broadcasting
opportunities. 1
2
The ramifications of the Daly decision were great. Congress
feared that such an interpretation of section 315 would "under-
mine the freedom of the press",13 encourage less effective cov-
erage, 4 and "make candidates the judges of news values.' 1 5 To
clarify the meaning of the statute and to remove any doubts as
to its intent,'6 Congress amended section 315 to allow for cer-
tain broadcasts not to be characterized as a "use." The
amended provision, set forth in section 315(a), pr6vides:
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast
(2) bona fide news interview
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the
candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or
subjects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (includ-
ing but not limited to political conventions and activities inci-
dental thereto), shall not be deemed to be use of a
broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection.
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as reliev-
ing broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of news-
casts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon
them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.' 7
11. "Equal time" is often used synonymously with "equal opportunities," however
the term is not accurate. The duration of the use of a broadcasting station is only one
factor in determining if an opposing candidate has the right to invoke the equal oppor-
tunities doctrine. Other factors considered by the FCC are the time of day the pro-
gram is aired and the number of people expected to be watching or listening at that
time. See Primer on Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2260, 43
RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 1353, 1381 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Primer].
12. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959). A "use," within the
meaning of § 315, is defined as any appearance of a legally qualified candidate, "no
matter how brief or perfunctory." Letter to Kenneth E. Spengler, 40 F.C.C. 279 (1956).
13. 105 CONG. REC. 5405 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Allott).
14. 105 CONG. REC. 3170 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Cunningham).
15. 105 CONG. REc. 8746 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Case).
16. 105 CONG. REC. 16236 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Flynt).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
No. 11
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This last sentence is often referred to as the "fairness doc-
trine" and must be distinguished from the equal opportunities
provision. The latter is triggered by the appearance of a per-
son-a legally qualified candidate for a public office-whereas
the former is triggered by the discussion of issues. 8 Thus,
under the fairness doctrine, if an issue of public importance is
presented on a broadcasting station by any person, the licen-
see is required to present opposing views on that issue. Since
the fairness doctrine requires only that the broadcaster pro-
vide a "reasonable opportunity" for conflicting views, the stan-
dard is more flexible than that provided by the equal
opportunitiesc provision.19 Under the fairness doctrine the
broadcaster can in good faith determine who can speak and the
amount of time required for the presentation. Under the equal
opportunities provision, however, all legally qualified candi-
dates for the same office are entitled to a time equivalent to
that used by their opponent.0
The four exemptions listed under section 315(a) allow the
appearance of a candidate on a broadcast without requiring the
licensee to provide equal opportunities for the candidate's op-
ponents. To be a non-use under this provision, a program must
meet the standard of either a "bona fide" newscast, interview,
documentary or live news event. In determining whether a
program has met this standard, the FCC established a non-ex-
haustive list of factors to consider.
(1) The format, nature and content of the programs;
(2) whether the format, nature or content of the program has
changed since its inception and, if so, in what respects; (3) who
initiates the programs; (4) who produces and controls the pro-
gram; (5) when the program was initiated; (6) is the program
regularly scheduled; and (7) if the program is regularly sched-
uled, specify the time and day of the week when it is
broadcast.21
The above criteria all focus on who has more control over the
program-the candidate or the broadcasting station. To be ex-
18. 1978 Primer, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2215-2216, 43 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1357. For an
understanding of the purpose, history and limits of the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
19. Note, The Equal Opportunity Doctrine in Political Broadcasting: Proposed
Modifications of the Communications Act of 1934, 12 IND. L REv. 745, 749 (1979).
20. 1978 Primer, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2216, 43 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1357.
21. Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 838,
19 RAD REG. 2D (P&F) 1913, 1917 (1970).
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empted, the station should be using the candidate rather than
the candidate using the station.22
To qualify as an exemption, the appearance must also be
newsworthy; that is, "the event to be covered . . .must be
news in and of itself.... 23 The broadcasting station or net-
work has broad discretion in determining if an item is news-
worthy or not. As long as the broadcaster's judgment is
reasonable and in good faith, the FCC will uphold the broad-
caster's determination of newsworthiness. 24
Within the last five years, the Commission has interpreted
section 315(a) (4), the on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events exemption, to include a large variety of political activi-
ties. In Aspen Institute,5 the FCC held that candidate debates
and press conferences are exempt under section 315(a) (4) pro-
vided that: (1) they are covered live; (2) the broadcaster has
no control over the content; and (3) they are based on the
broadcaster's reasonable and good faith determination of their
newsworthiness. The criterion of live coverage has since
changed to allow for delayed tapings; the length of the time de-
lay being only a factor in determining the broadcaster's reason-
ableness and good faith.26  Press conferences are also
considered bona fide for the purposes of section 315(a) al-
though they are initiated and controlled by the speaker and are
not regularly scheduled.
Presidential addresses concerning "specific, current and ex-
22. The legislative history of the section 315(a) amendment supports this conclu-
sion. In discussing the term "bona fide," Representative Harris stated in his confer-
ence report that "the expression... is used to emphasize the intention to limit the
exemptions from the equal time requirement to cases where the appearance of a can-
didate is not designed to serve the political advantage of that candidate." H.R. 1069,
86th Cong., 1st sess., 105 CONG. REC. 17777 (1959).
23. 105 CONG. REC. 16241 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
24. Congress viewed the licensee's power to use its own news judgment as the
lesser of two evils. Even though discrimination against one candidate could be ex-
pected, Congress preferred this possibility to the interference of political coverage that
was bound to occur if the Daly decision was upheld. See 105 CONG. REc. 14439 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Pastore). Furthermore, the licensee still is reviewed by the FCC in
connection with renewing its application for a license to determine if it has met its
obligation to serve in the public interest, thereby decreasing the likelihood of bad faith
news judgments. See 105 CONG. REC. 16241 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
25. 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 35 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 49 (1975), aff'd sub non. Chisholm v.
FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. Delaware Broadcasting Co., 60 F.C.C.2d 1030, 38 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 831 (1976),
affid sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 590
F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
No. 11
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traordinary international events"27 are likewise not considered
to be uses within the scope of section 315(a). In 1956, when
President Eisenhower spoke to the nation concerning the Suez
crisis, the FCC held that Congress did not intend that the Pres-
ident, acting as the chief executive officer of the United States,
should be indistinguishable from his role as a political candi-
date.28 Thus, the FCC determined that section 315 did not ap-
ply to the President's broadcast.29 When Congress amended
section 315(a), the Commission interpreted section 315(a) (4)
to include all such presidential addresses.30 Thus, if the broad-
cast is a reasonable, good faith news judgment of the licensee,
a presidential address can be broadcast on stations and net-
works without triggering the equal opportunities doctrine.
The FCC interpretations of section 315(a), its definition of
who is included under the category of "legally qualified candi-
dates," and the President's inherent power as the head politi-
cal figure in the United States, have all increased the
discrimination against non-incumbent candidates in the media
and allowed the President to manipulate broadcasting stations
and networks to his advantage.
III
The Incumbent's Advantages
A. The Legally Qualified Candidate
In July 1978, the FCC revised its definition of a "legally quali-
fied candidate" as related to political broadcasts. Prior to that
time, the definition encompassed any person who had publicly
announced his candidacy, had met the qualifications pre-
scribed by the applicable laws (federal, state or local), and who
either qualified for a place on the ballot or publicly committed
himself by the write-in method and made a substantial show-
ing of bona fide candidacy.3 1 The Commission was concerned
with three problems in the rules: (1) candidates seeking nomi-
nation by means other than primary elections (e.g., caucuses
or conventions) had no specific requirements for becoming le-
gally qualified candidates other than publicly announcing can-
27. Letter to Republican National Committee, 40 F.C.C. 408 (1964).
28. Public Notice 38387, 40 F.C.C. 276 (1956).
29. Id.
30. Republican National Committee, 40 F.C.C. 408 (1964).
31. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.290, 73.657, 76.5(y) (1977).
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didacy and being eligible for the office under the applicable
law; (2) ballot candidates were at an inherent disadvantage
since write-in candidates could qualify much earlier; and
(3) no specific criteria to qualify as a candidate for nomination
for the office of President or Vice President of the United
States were mentioned in the rules.2
The revised rule, effective August 28, 1978,11 distinguishes be-
tween persons seeking nomination and those seeking election
to the presidential office. The significance of this distinction is
that during the primaries only those legally qualified candi-
dates of the same party can demand equal opportunities when
a candidate for that particular party uses the broadcasting sta-
tion. Therefore, if a Republican candidate for nomination for
the presidency uses a station, only other qualified Republican
candidates can request equal time. 4
Under both the old and the revised rules a person seeking
the nomination for, and/or election to the office of President or
Vice President of the United States, must publicly announce
his intention to run. The FCC has indicated that the purpose
of this requirement was to avoid requiring a broadcaster to de-
termine whether the incumbent's activities indicate an inten-
tion to run for re-election. The Commission claimed that for
it to interpret the incumbent's activities and to determine the
incumbent's motives and intentions would be difficult, if not
impossible.3 6 Furthermore, the necessity for such determina-
tions could lead licensees to avoid covering any public or politi-
cal figures. 7 However, the requirement of announcing one's
candidacy publicly has created an incentive, contrary to the in-
tention of section 315,38 for incumbents to withhold announce-
ment while continuing to be covered by the broadcasting
stations, thereby excluding opponents from equal
32. Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Broad-
casts and Cablecasts by Legally Qualified Candidates for Public Office, 67 F.C.C.2d 956,
957 (1978).
33. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (1979).
34. 1978 Primer, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2218, 43 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1359.
35. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, 11 F.C.C.2d 511, 513, 12 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 106,
107, affrd, 390 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
36. Id.
37. Id.; National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 75 F.C.C.2d 650, 656, 46 RAD.
REG. 2D (P&F) 1, 6 (1979).
38. See notes 37-48 and accompanying text, infra.
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opportunities. 9
Although non-incumbents can also withhold announcement,
the President, by virtue of his official position, is usually more
newsworthy than his opponents. Therefore, he is more likely
to receive coverage by the media prior to announcing his candi-
dacy than the non-incumbent candidate. Indeed, in some
cases, the only fact that makes a non-incumbent candidate
newsworthy is his candidacy. Thus, an early public announce-
ment may be more beneficial to the non-incumbent than a
delayed announcement of his intention to seek the nomination
or office.
The incumbent presidents in the last decade have, in fact,
withheld public announcement of their intention to run for re-
election even when it was apparent from their activities that
they would run. For example, President Nixon appeared on
television several times before announcing his candidacy for
the Republican nomination. When newscaster Dan Rather di-
rectly questioned President Nixon on his future plans in Janu-
ary 1972, Nixon merely stated "there is good reason to think I
might make the decision in that direction."'  President Carter
was the last of the fourteen presidential candidates to an-
nounce publicly his intention to run in the 1980 election, finally
making his announcement over one year and four months after
the first person had announced his candidacy.4 '
Both the federal courts and the Commission have upheld the
public announcement requirement despite its apparent abuse
by incumbent Presidents.' In 1968, Senator Eugene McCarthy
requested equal time due to the broadcast of the program "A
Conversation with President Johnson." The FCC rejected the
Senator's claim since the President had not publicly an-
nounced that he was seeking re-election.43 In 1972, President
Nixon appeared on a one-hour television broadcast. The Dem-
ocratic National Committee (DNC) requested equal time.
Again the Commission rejected the petitioner's argument, as
39. Note, FCC Implementation of the Section 315(a) Exemptions: The Disappear-
ance of the Equal Time Doctrine, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 70, 73 (1976).
40. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
41. Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 645 n.20, 46 RAD.
REG. 2D (P&F) 829, 840 n.20 (1980).
42. See Senator Eugene McCarthy, 11 F.C.C.2d at 511, 12 RAI. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1;
Democratic National Committee, 34 F.C.C.2d 572, 24 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 178 (1972).
43. Senator Eugene McCarthy, 11 F.C.C.2d at 514, 12 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1.
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the President had not formally announced his candidacy. 4
The FCC claims that although one cannot receive equal op-
portunities if the person using the broadcast station has not
publicly announced seeking election or nomination as his
party's candidate, the appearance can still trigger the fairness
doctrine.4 However, the fairness doctrine does not solve the
inequities of media exposure of the incumbent and his
opponents.
Under the fairness doctrine, whenever a licensee presents an
issue of public importance he has an obligation to present op-
posing views.46 The FCC has given licensees discretion to de-
termine whether an issue is controversial in nature, and if so,
who has the right to reply. In fact, the Commission claims that
"(t)he genius of the fairness doctrine has been precisely the
leeway and discretion it affords the licensee to discharge his
obligation to contribute to an informed electorate. ' 47 Thus, if
the President uses the media to speak on a controversial issue
before publicly announcing his intention to seek re-election,
the broadcaster has no obligation to allow any legally qualified
candidate to present opposing views on that issue.48 The
broadcaster can choose any person or group to represent the
opposing viewpoint as long as the choice is reasonable and
made in good faith. By choosing someone other than presiden-
tial candidates, the licensee may allow the President to ex-
press his views while preventing other candidates from
personally presenting theirs. Since the ability of the voter to
recognize the candidate and to associate the candidate with his
political beliefs is essential in making an informed voting deci-
sion, a broadcaster's refusal of equal opportunities to the in-
cumbent's opponents could be fatal to their campaign. The
importance of the broadcaster's determination is accentuated
44. Democratic National Committee, 34 F.C.C.2d 572, 24 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 178
(1972).
45. See Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 898-9 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Note, Consideration of Only Selected Presidential Speeches is Arbitrary, and Therefore
Impermissible, Where "Responsiveness" to Prior Presidential Speeches is the Criterion
for Granting Time Under the Fairness Doctrine-Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission, 454 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 22 J. PuB. L.
257, 262-3 (1973).
46. See note 16, supra.
47. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public In-
terest Standards of the Communications Act: First Report-Handling of Political
Broadcast, 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 48, 24 RAn. REG. 2D (P&F) 1917, 1926 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Anthony J. Russo, 28 F.C.C.2d 687, 688 (1971).
No. 11
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for third-party candidates 49 who usually have limited funds
and support in the early stages of a campaign.50 The President,
on the other hand, is benefitted by the licensee's decision not
to broadcast the other presidential candidates, for he will re-
ceive more public exposure than his future opponents. Even if
the broadcaster affords one of the legally qualified candidates a
reasonable opportunity to present his views, the use is limited
to the issue in question. Therefore, the President indirectly
determines and controls the range of issues discussed.
B. The Exemptions
Section 315(a) states that any use of a broadcasting station
by a legally qualified candidate triggers equal opportunities for
all other candidates for the same office. The FCC has broadly
defined "use" to include "all appearances of a candidate no
matter how brief or perfunctory.951 The appearance need not
be political in nature. Thus, television re-runs of a film by an
actor-turned-politician 52 and a television series starring a can-
didate whose livelihood depends on his acting career5 3 both
constitute uses for the purpose of section 315. The Commis-
sion excludes only the four exemptions listed under section
315(a) .
In creating the four exemptions, Congress balanced the
broadcaster's First Amendment right of broad discretion in re-
porting the news against the candidate's interest in being
heard and seen by the electorate, making a policy decision in
favor of the broadcasters in order to avoid the possibility of no
coverage of political broadcasts. 55 Thus, any newsworthy
event, as determined by the licensee's reasonable good faith
judgment, can be extensively covered without triggering the
equal opportunity doctrine.
Congress' decision to create the four exemptions to the ap-
49. "Minor" or "third" party candidates are candidates not running as a Demo-
cratic or Republican candidate.
50. Note, Equal Time for Political Candidates, 23 N.Y. INTRA. LR. 266, 272-273
(1968).
51. Letter to Kenneth E. Spengler, 40 F.C.C. 279 (1956).
52. Adrien Weiss, 58 F.C.C.2d 342, 36 RAn. REG. 2D (P&F) 292 (1976).
53. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 297 (1972), affd sub nom. Pat Paul-
sen v. F.C.C., 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. See text accompanying note 17, supra.
55. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Use of Broadcast Facilities
by Candidates for Public Office, 3 F.C.C.2d 463, 473, 7 RAD. REQ. 2D (P&F) 1901, 1907
(1966).
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plication of the equal opportunities doctrine was based more
on the fear of a "virtual blackout in the presentation of candi-
dates" on television and radio than on solicitude for broadcast-
ers' First Amendment rights. 6 In weighing the candidates' and
broadcasters' interests, Congress believed that the benefit to
the public in receiving information and avoiding political
broadcast "blackout" outweighed the possibility of broadcaster
favoritism. 7
If the benefit to society in maintaining an informed public
was indeed the overriding consideration in the decision to cre-
ate the four exemptions, then the exemptions seem unlikely to
achieve their purpose. First, the possibility of a political broad-
cast blackout is unlikely in the United States where the presi-
dential election is of such national interest and import. The
"drying up" of "meaningful radio and television coverage of
political campaigns "58 would adversely affect the broadcasters,
for they would lose their audience. Second, broadcasts that
present solely or primarily one viewpoint do not create a more
informed electorate than would exist in the absence of all polit-
ical broadcasts. A voter can reach an informed decision only if
he has received information from all platforms.
The President, by virtue of the office he holds, is a news-
worthy figure. Anything he says or does is, by definition, news-
worthy. 9 As Judge Tamm stated in his opinion in Democratic
National Committee v. FCC:
By the very nature of his position the President is a focal point
of national life. The people of this country look to him in his
numerous roles for guidance, understanding, perspective and
56. The Senate Report stated that it was:
not unmindful that the class of programs being exempted from the equal time
requirements would offer a temptation as well as an opportunity for a broad-
caster to push his favorite candidate and to exclude others. That is a danger.
The committee clearly recognizes this to be a definite obstacle but feels that
the alternative to standing pat and maintaining status quo could lead to a vir-
tual blackout in the presentation of candidates on the news-type programs.
This would not, in the opinion of the committee, serve the public interest....
The public benefits are so great that they outweigh the risk that may result
from the favoritism that may be shown by some partisan broadcasters.
S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2564, 2572.
57. Id.; see also Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
58. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2564, 2572.
59. Handling of Political Broadcast, 36 F.C.C.2d at 56,24 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1934
(Comm'r Johnson, dissenting).
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information. No matter who the man living at 1600 Penn-
sylvania Avenue is he will be subject to greater coverage in the
press and on the media than any other person in the free
world.6 °
As Chief Executive Officer of the United States, the Presi-
dent necessarily should be the person to address the country
on matters of national importance. In that capacity, Americans
do look to him for "guidance", and matters of national impor-
tance are newsworthy in and of themselves. However, because
of the inherent newsworthiness of the President as a public
and political figure, many non-newsworthy aspects of his daily
N, duties or home life are also covered by the media.61 The non-
incumbent candidate, not being as newsworthy as the Presi-
dent, cannot receive the extensive media coverage given to the
incumbent.62 He must, by his own efforts, make his activities
newsworthy events to be exempt from the equal opportunities
doctrine under section 315. Therefore, since the incumbent, by
virtue of his office, is a more newsworthy figure than his oppo-
nents, he can reap the advantage of receiving the media's at-
tention without considerable effort on his part.
The FCC decisions regarding the 1959 amendment to section
315(a) have done nothing to equalize the media's treatment of
candidates. In fact, they have enlarged the gap between the
coverage offered the incumbent and his opponents by deciding
that the determination of newsworthiness lies solely in the li-
censee's reasonable, bona fide discretion. The politician's mo-
tives are immaterial. The President can "create" a
newsworthy event, and by being a newsworthy person, he can
thereby receive exclusive media coverage under one of the
four exemptions listed under section 315(a). If a legally quali-
fied candidate challenges the newsworthiness of the appear-
ance, claiming it to be a use, the Commission will look only to
the reasonableness of the broadcaster's judgment no matter
how obvious the President's intentions were. There is no dis-
60. Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61. Note, Keeping Third Parties Minor: Political Party Access to Broadcast, 12 IND.
L. REv. 713, 732 (1979); Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commis-
sion, 487 F. Supp. 280, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Appendix A), affid, - U.S. - (1980).
62. During an election certain non-incumbent candidates will reach the status of
being newsworthy by virtue of their candidacy, such as the candidate for the major
party opposing the presidential incumbent. Other candidates, representing small mi-
nor parties, may never reach that status. Newsworthiness, therefore, is a matter of
degree and not determined by a mathematical test or by the consensus of the
broadcasters.
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tinction in the motivations of the "President qua President and
the President in his political capacity." 63 Thus, when Senator
Edward Kennedy contested President Carter's press confer-
ence of February 13, 1980 where the President discussed his
"Rose Garden strategy"' and allegedly directly attacked Ken-
nedy, the Commission stated: "An incumbent President may
well have an advantage over his opponents in attracting media
coverage. However, absent strong evidence that broadcasters
were not exercising their bona fide news judgment, the Com-
mission will not interfere with such judgments. 65
Concededly, the President has the right and the obligation to
speak to his constituents; but by not taking into account his
motives in asking for media coverage, the FCC is giving the
President free rein to manipulate the media. The broadcaster,
who will be likely to cover any event the President claims is
newsworthy, may not be chastised by the Commission for even
an unreasonable or bad faith judgment if the event itself is not
newsworthy since it can always be argued that the President is
a newsworthy figure.
For example, the FCC has interpreted section 315 (a) (4), pro-
viding an exemption for on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events, to include a Presidential report of a "specific, current
and extraordinary international"66 event. However, the Presi-
dent often has the power to control when an event will occur or
even to create a crisis. Since the only determination of new-
sworthiness is based on the broadcaster's judgment, "there is a
vast untapped potential for dramatic eleventh-hour multi-net-
work appeals to the electorate, in which the incumbent
presents himself as the man of the hour, giving the impression
that he, and he alone, can safely steer the ship of state through
63. Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
64. At the February 13, 1980 press conference, President Carter stated that he will
not publicly campaign for re-election during a crisis situation:
But I, as President, have got to maintain the accurate image that we do have a
crisis, which I will not ignore until those hostages are released.
I want the American people to know it. I want the Iranians to know it. I want
the hostages' families and the hostages to know it. I want the world to know
that I am not going to resume business-as-usual as a partisan campaigner out
on the campaign trail until our hostages are back here-free and at home.
Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1980, at A16, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1980, at Al, A17.
The President's anti-campaigning tactic became known by the media as his "Rose
Garden Strategy." See Out of the Rose Garden, TiME, May 12, 1980, at 31.
65. Kennedy for President Committee, 76 F.C.C.2d 201, 204 (1980).
66. Letter to Republican National Committee, 40 F.C.C. 408 (1964).
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the present storm."67
The potential for the incumbent's abuse of the media has in-
creased with the FCC's decision to include press conferences
and debates under the section 315(a) (4) exemption.68 Al-
though press conferences are exempt for non-incumbent can-
didates as well, because the President is a newsworthy figure
and is speaking as the voice of the government, his press con-
ferences are more likely to be broadcast than those of his
opponents. 69
The requirement that a broadcast of a debate or a press con-
ference be live70 or delayed only for a short period of time,7'
compels the licensee to decide whether the event is news-
worthy before it occurs.72 Thus, the licensee cannot judge the
newsworthiness on the issues to be discussed, for they are un-
known at the time of determining whether to broadcast the
event. The sole basis for the broadcaster's judgment, there-
fore, must rest on the newsworthiness of the speaker. The re-
sult is that the incumbent, by virtue of his office, is allowed
more access to the media than the other candidates.
C. The Power of the President's Office
The purpose of political campaigns should be to reach the
largest number of potential voters and inform them of the can-
didate's stand on issues of local and national importance.73
Mass media naturally play a major role in disseminating such
67. Comment, Presidential Politics and Political Prerequisites: The Application of
Section 315 and the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to the Appearance of Incumbents in their
Official Capacities, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 481, 497 (1971); Committee for the Fair Broad-
casting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 307-308, 19 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 1103,
1129-1130 (1970) (Comm'r Johnson, concurring). In the 1980 election, President Carter
was accused of creating such a "pseudo-event" when he made a report on the possible
release of the Iranian hostages days before the general election.
68. Aspen Institute, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 35 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 49 (1975), affid sub nom.
Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Delaware Broadcasting Co., 60 F.C.C.2d
1030, 38 RAn. REG. 2D (P&F) 831 (1976), affd sub nom. Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 590 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
69. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1020 (1971); Free-
dom & Edelstein, Political Campaigning and the Airways, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 178,
200-02 (1974).
70. Aspen Institute, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 35 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 49 (1975).
71. Delaware Broadcasting Co., 60 F.C.C.2d 1030, 38 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 831.
72. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d at 377 n.50 (Skelley-Wright, J., dissenting).
73. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1975); Letter to Republican National Com-
mittee, 40 F.C.C. 413, 416 (1964) (Comm'r Hyde, dissenting).
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political information. 4 In 1934, Congress already recognized
the impact radio had on controlling public sentiment in choos-
ing political leaders.75 During the 1976 election year, 75% of the
information about candidates for national office was acquired
by the public from television and four percent from radio.76
Thus, "except in most untoward circumstances, an appearance
will constitute a benefit...,7 for the candidate by giving him
exposure to the public.
Although the President does not need public recognition to
the extent the other candidates do, television appearances
greatly benefit the incumbent by increasing public support for
his policies. In 1964, President Johnson gave an address to the
nation announcing his order to commence retaliatory bombing
of North Vietnam. A Harris poll indicated that after the ad-
dress, public support of the President's conduct regarding the
war increased from 42% to 72%.78 In 1970, eleven months after
announcing his plan for phased withdrawal in Vietnam, Presi-
dent Nixon addressed the nation to explain his decision to
send troops into Cambodia, at which time public support for
his decision increased from seven percent before the address
to 50% after the address. 79 Harris, having compiled and ana-
lyzed his 1963 to 1970 election polls, concluded that presidential
television appearances significantly increase public support:
"The pattern is so consistent, with so few exceptions that it is
probably fair to conclude that Presidential use of television al-
most automatically gives him an important advantage."8
The President has more resources available to receive the
maximum coverage beneficial to him than any other candidate.
His views can be presented by other high government officials
representing him.8 More importantly, he has a large, perma-
nent, trained staff to help him appear in the best light possible:
The permanent White House press corps covers his [the Presi-
74. Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
75. 78 CONG. REC. 10307 (1934) (remarks of Rep. McFadden).
76. See generally THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 2.
77. Letter to Republican National Committee, 40 F.C.C. 413, 416 (1964) (Comm'r
Hyde, dissenting).
78. See Harris, President's Use of TV Helps, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 3, 1970, § 2, at
17.
79. See generally Rutkus, A Report on Simultaneous Television Network Coverage
of Presidential Addresses to the Nation, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
Jan. 12, 1976.
80. Id.
81. Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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dent's] every public word. The President has available to him
the ultimate in research capabilities, writers, and production
advisors in public relations and television performance. He
has a large staff including the Director of Communications and
White House Press Office to serve newsmen and media owners
in ways designed to encourage them to help make the most
favorable possible impression upon the American people.
Techniques of advertising, propaganda and public relations are
known, effective, and used .... 82
The President can also manipulate the media by using the
influence of his office to coerce network and station owners to
broadcast. When the President wishes to speak on an issue,
the press secretary contacts the networks and informs them
that an event is "available" for live coverage. If the networks
decline, the President, through the press secretary, makes a
formal request for coverage. The formal request appeals to the
networks to reconsider their decision.83 Although such a pro-
cedure in theory appears to give the licensee the final word in
choosing what to cover, the reality is that it is hard to turn
down a president. In fact, from January, 1966 to December,
1975, out of the forty-five requests made by Presidents John-
son, Nixon and Ford for simultaneous television coverage,
forty-four were granted.84 The power of the President's posi-
tion makes it difficult for the broadcaster to question a presi-
dent's claim that information is newsworthy.
IV
The Necessity for Change: Proposals
Dispite the obvious flaws of section 315(a) and the inherent
advantages to the incumbent candidate, Congress refuses to
repeal or amend the statute85 , and the FCC continues to inter-
pret the equal opportunities doctrine in favor of broad licensee
discretionary power and against government regulation of
82. Handling of Political Broadcast, 36 F.C.C.2d at 56,24 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) AT 1934
(Comm'r Johnson, dissenting).
83. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 41, col. 1.
84. CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE REPORT, supra note 64, at 21-25. President Ford's re-
quested coverage of his tax cut/spending proposal in October 1975 was the only re-
quest denied within the ten year period. Only one of the three major networks agreed
to carry it on television.
85. It should be noted, however, that in practically every term during the last
twenty years both the House and the Senate have proposed bills to modify or repeal
the equal opportunities doctrine.
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political broadcasts. 6 The Commission's rationale is two-fold.
First, the broadcaster has the First Amendment right to cover
news free from inhibiting governmental interference."' Sec-
ond, strict regulation would inundate the media with political
broadcasts, requiring the broadcaster to afford equal opportu-
nities to all minor, as well as major, party candidates, thereby
restricting the broadcaster's First Amendment right or leading
to complete avoidance of political broadcasts.
In deregulating political broadcasting, however, the FCC has
lost sight of the original purpose of the Communications Act of
1934 and its predecessor, the Radio Act of 1927-to serve the
public interest.8 Probably one of the greatest matters of inter-
est in a democratic society is making an informed choice on
political issues.89 In the United States, the election process is
the major means by which the public can express its opinions
about the present leaders and political decisions. However,
the current rulings on section 315 force the public to make deci-
sion with a limited amount of information. Deregulation cre-
ates inherent advantages to the incumbent and disadvantages
to minor party candidates in gaining access to the media. Dur-
ing an election year, the public is continually subjected to the
broadcasts of the President, yet it may learn little about many
of his opponents.
Also, by stressing the newsworthiness criterion for a section
315(a) exemption and leaving the discretion in the broadcast-
ers, the FCC has forced politics to become based on personali-
ties, rather than the issues in a campaign. 0 This result is
inevitable because the licensee must frequently base his deci-
86. The Commission's present view... may be seen as part of the rising tide
of deregulation that has washed away much public support for government
restriction on private activity. Examples of this trend, within the communica-
tions area, in addition to the FCC's actions in Aspen and Delaware Broadcast-
ing, are numerous.... [Tihe Commission restricted the definition of
"legally qualified candidate" and thereby limited the number of candidates
who might qualify for equal access under section 315(a). In the same order,
the Commission reduced the period before a nominating procedure during
which a candidate could claim equal time.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 590 F.2d at 1069 n.30.
87. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
88. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94,
110 (1973).
89. For a discussion of the importance of informed decisions, see D. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE (1979).
90. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d at 377 (Skelley-Wright, J., dissenting).
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sion on the newsworthiness of the candidate as a 'personality'
without knowing the content of the broadcast.9' The increased
use of spot announcements,92 which evade the necessity to dis-
cuss issues, is an indication of the trend toward stressing per-
sonality.93 The voter, therefore, is encouraged to make his
election decision not on an informed opinion of who will carry
out policy decisions most favorable to him, but on which candi-
date has the most "sex appeal."94
With the trend toward personality campaigning becoming
more apparent each election year, it is time for the legislature
to take action to insure that the original spirit of section 315
and the Communications Act of 1934 is not lost. Because the
public interest in an informed electorate should outweigh the
broadcasters' journalistic interests, and because the likelihood
that political broadcasts will be eliminated is slight, govern-
ment intervention is necessary.95
Those opposed to requiring government intervention have
mainly stressed the current trend toward deregulation within
the political broadcasting arena.96 This argument, however, is
neither justified nor fully accurate. In 1972, for example, Con-
gress enacted the reasonable access provision 97 to "enlarge the
basic fiduciary obligations of broadcasters to inform the electo-
rate by making the media more accessible to federal candi-
dates."98 Thus, since 1972 Congress has been aware that the
broadcaster's interest must, at times, yield to the electorate's
needs and does not give broadcasters an absolute First
Amendment right to use their complete discretion in political
broadcasting.
91. Id.; see notes 57-68 and accompanying text, supra.
92. Spot announcements are television advertisements of short duration, usually
lasting less than a minute.
93. Note, Political Broadcasts and the Informed Electorate: A Call for Action, 22
CATH. U.L. REV. 177, 184-185 (1972); GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN PoLITIcs 157
(1981).
94. A Gallup poll taken after the 1980 election confirms the fact that voters feel
cheated by the present campaigning techniques. Sixty-six percent of those polled
claimed that they would favor changes in political campaigns. The list of complaints
included the lack of discussion of issues. S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 24, 1980, at .12.
95. "Only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh the private jour-
nalistic interests of the broadcasters will government power be asserted within the
framework of the Act." Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
96. See note 81, supra.
97. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1980).
98. Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 644 n.17 (1979).
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In requiring more government regulation, the Commission
should not leave the judgment of newsworthiness solely in the
hands of the licensee. It should require that the event or issue
in and of itself, apart from the identity of the candidate be
newsworthy to exempt the broadcast under section 315(a). In
doing so, the FCC would prevent many unimportant ceremo-
nial activities performed by the incumbent from being widely
covered by the media. The FCC should also list factors to be
considered in determining newsworthiness. 99 The list should
explicitly include the politician's motives. Although a candi-
date's motive will almost always be maximum exposure, 100 the
FCC should be more wary of allowing "staged events" and
"stump speeches" to be covered. In ascertaining the candi-
date's motives, the broadcaster should look at the timing of the
announcement for candidacy in relation to the time of the elec-
tion and the immediacy of the event as well as other factors as
may be determined by the FCC or the legislature. These fac-
tors will assist the broadcaster in determining whether the
broadcast had an independent significant newsworthy motive
apart from the motive to campaign.
If a speech is covered live and the candidate then proceeds
on his own initiative to use his time for obviously non-news-
worthy purposes such as attacking opponents, equal opportu-
nities should be allowed for the portion of time spent for non-
newsworthy purposes. The candidate who has used the broad-
casting facility for obviously non-newsworthy ends should be
liable for the cost of his opponent's time, to discourage this
abuse.
A requirement that the FCC assist in the determination of
what is newsworthy and that it look to the candidate's motive
would not be inconsistent with other decisions of the Commis-
sion in the area of political broadcasting. For example, in eval-
uating a claim for reasonable access under section 312(a) (7),
the FCC identified the candidate's needs as a relevant factor.' 0
99. The FCC has done this in the past regarding other definitions such as "bona
fide" see note 21 and accompanying text, supra, and "reasonableness of a broad-
caster's judgment," see Commission on Policy on Enforcing Section 312(a) (7) of the
Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1089-90, 43 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) 1029, 1043-44
(1978).
100. Letter to Republican National Committee, 40 F.C.C. 413, 416 (1964) (Comm'r
Hyde, dissenting): 105 CONG. REC. 16241 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
101. Commission on Policy on Enforcing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications
Act, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1089, 43 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 1043.
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In taking the candidate's needs into account, both the candi-
date's and the broadcaster's assessments are relevant.
10 2
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee,103 the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that the government may be required to impose
restraints on broadcasters "in the public interest" which would
not be required under the First Amendment. 10 4 By issuing de-
finitive criteria and regulations for the broadcaster, as sug-
gested in this note, the legislature would not inhibit or restrict
the licensee's First Amendment rights; rather, it would help
the broadcasters reach consistent good faith determinations
under the equal opportunities doctrine. At present, such a list
is used to assist the broadcaster in determining whether the
discussion of an issue invokes the fairness doctrine.0 5 Thus,
such an idea is not foreign to the FCC and its licensees. More-
over, such criteria could decrease the likelihood of frequent ap-
peals to the FCC and the judiciary, as the broadcasters could
support their decisions by merely citing listed criteria that had
not been met by the candidates.
Furthermore, setting out relevant factors to consider in de-
termining the newsworthiness of a broadcast is not inconsis-
tent with the government's role in radio and television. As the
Supreme Court stated in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.,1°6 the licensee's role is that of a public trustee, with the
government acting "as an 'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and
guardian of the public interest."'1 7 The criteria would thus pro-
tect the broadcaster as a public trustee by listing the require-
ments necessary to fulfill the public interest standards.
Furthermore, the criteria would be consistent with the role of
the government in assuring that broadcasters meet their
obligations.
The Commission should also discard the "legally qualified
candidate's" public announcement requirement, which was en-
acted to avoid requiring broadcasters to determine whether
the incumbent's activities indicate an intention to seek re-elec-
102. Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, 74 F.C.C.2d at 642.
103. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
104. Id. at 143 (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251-1252
(1949).
106. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94,
117 (1973).
107. Id.
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tion.1°8 The rule should only require that a person seeking
nomination for, or election to, the office of President or Vice
President must: (1) be qualified for the office; and (2) qualify
for a place on the ballot or make a substantial showing that he
is a bona fide candidate. 9 The public declaration requirement
should be abolished, because it allows the incumbent and ma-
jor party candidates with strong financial backing"' to deprive
publicly declared candidates of equal opportunities.
The suggestion that public announcement be deleted from
the present rule defining "legally qualified candidate" was
made to the FCC in 1979 by the National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting."' The Commission rejected the suggested
amendment, claiming that such a flexible rule would lead
licensees to discontinue coverage of public figures." 2 How-
ever, in its opinion the FCC did claim:
[I]f he made a substantial showing that he was a candidate, as
set forth in 73.1940(a) (5), it is quite possible that the Commis-
sion would find that his statements or perhaps even his behav-
ior constituted the equivalent of a public announcement. On
that basis the Commission might further find him legally quali-
fied under our rules .... Certainly the Commission would not
ignore such evidence and allow a claim by the candidate that
he is not legally qualified since he "has not announced yet."
Such evidence would constitute a public announcement of
candidacy."13
Thus, the Commission acknowledged that the public declara-
tion of candidacy is neither an absolute nor a necessary re-
108. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(a) (5) defines substantial showing as:
evidence that the person claiming to be a candidate has engaged to a substan-
tial degree in activities commonly associated with political campaigning. Such
activities normally would include making campaign speeches, distributing
campaign literature, issuing press releases, maintaining a campaign commit:
tee, and establishing campaign headquarters (even though the headquarters
in some instances might be the residence of the candidate or his campaign
manager). Not all of the listed activities are necessarily required in each case
to demonstrate a substantial showing, and there may be activities not listed
herein which would contribute to such a showing.
109. See note 34 and accompanying text, supra.
110. For example, in the 1980 election, the National Committee for Broadcasting
claimed that both Ronald Reagan and Senator Howard Baker, Jr., were purposefully
flaunting their "disrespect for the integrity of the electoral process that Section 315 was
intended to protect." National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 75 F.C.C.2d 650,
652 n.5, 46 RAD. REo. 2D (P&F) 1, 4 n.5 (1979).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 656, 46 RAD. REG. 2D (P&F) at 7.
113. Id. at 657, 46 RAn. REG. 2D (P&F) at 7.
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quirement in determining if one is a legally qualified
candidate.
Furthermore, if the public announcement requirement is dis-
carded, it is unlikely that broadcasters will avoid covering pub-
lic and political figures because they would not know if the
candidate has shown an intention to seek election. The evi-
dence necessary for a substantial showing of bona fide candi-
dacy is specific, and requires a great amount of obvious
political campaigning activities before the burden of a substan-
tial showing is met.
In addition, the broadcaster would not be more inundated
with equal opportunities claims from minor party candidates
than at present. Usually minor candidates publicly announce
their candidacy earlier in a campaign because they lack funds
and public recognition. By their declaration of candidacy, they
can make use of the equal opportunities provision and can try
to attract delegates and contributions before the major party
candidates start their campaign. Thus, the third party candi-
dates would continue to seek qualification early in the cam-
paign and thereby make no more equal opportunities claims
than at present.
A final proposal is to incorporate both the fairness doctrine
and the equal opportunities doctrine into one statutory provi-
sion. Under this new provision, an appearance during the elec-
tion year in which the President discussed a controversial
issue of public importance would afford proportionately equal
opportunities to all other legally qualified candidates for the
same office.
This quasi-fairness/quasi-equal opportunities doctrine
would be, by its definition, issue-oriented-triggered by an is-
sue of public importance. Political broadcasts would thereby
change from their present form based on the candidates' per-
sonalities to one where the public is informed about the candi-
dates' platforms. However, the provision, recognizing the
importance of voter recognition and the image the candidate
wishes to portray, would require that the candidates them-
selves be given the right to discuss their views, rather than any
person who represents an opposing view of the speaker.
To avoid flooding the media with political broadcasts, the
new provision would require that all other legally qualified
candidates be provided with a mathematically determined per-
centage of time. Past proposals to modify section 315 based on
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a percentage system have based their equations on the per-
centage of popular votes the candidate received in the immedi-
ately preceding elections for the office contested." 4
Determining percentages on such a basis, however, would dis-
criminate against newly-created third parties or minor parties
that become popular only in the recent election because of
sudden splits within the major parties.'15 Instead, this new
provision would allot each candidate a proportionately equal
percentage of the amount of time of the President's appear-
ance. The percentage would be determined by how long the
President used the broadcasting facilities. For example, each
candidate would be entitled to a four minute use when the
President appeared on a half-hour program." 6
Under such an approach, political broadcasting would in-
crease but by a limited amount of time. Even though the time
afforded candidates would be less than that given the Presi-
dent, the time would be spent on the discussion of issues in-
voking the provision--disseminating more information to the
public than under the present system. The time would be
equally distributed among all other legally qualified candidates
who qualify for office and either qualify for a place on the ballot
or make a substantial showing of bona fide candidacy, instead
of a distribution based on the percent of popular votes. Such a
proposal still allows the incumbent President indirectly to de-
termine the issues to be discussed, but nevertheless allows his
opponents to present their views on these issues.
V
Conclusion
Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 to serve
the public interest. However, the current interpretations and
114. See generally Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal, 3 HAv. J. LEGIS. 257
(1966).
115. Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27 MD. L. REV.
221, 244-45 (1967).
116. The 4-30 proportion is an arbitrary figure and may be inadequate. The percent-
age determined to be fair and reasonable by the legislature must be determined by
taking into account the needs and interests of the broadcasters, public and candidates.
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has proposed that for every two prime time appear-
ances by the President occurring on all three networks, the opposition must be al-
lowed a prime time, simultaneous program. The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 36
F.C.C.2d 40, 61-64 (1972) (Commr Johnson, dissenting).
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rulings by the FCC regarding section 315 appear to work
mainly in the interest of the incumbent seeking re-election.
Furthermore, the incumbent, aware of the inconsistent deci-
sions in political broadcasting, uses his position and power to
receive the maximum benefits of media exposure. The public
receives only limited information on non-incumbent, legally
qualified candidates, thereby making it difficult to reach an in-
formed decision when choosing the nation's leaders.
The time has therefore come for a change in the political
broadcasting system-to require government to regulate the
media for the benefit of the public. The proposals suggested in
this note are not the only possible solutions to the problem,
nor, perhaps, the best; however, it is hoped the suggestions will
inspire Congress to take action before the next national
election.
